This paper considers a non-cooperative game in which competing users sharing a frequency-selective interference channel selfishly optimize their power allocation in order to improve their achievable rates.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-user communication systems represent competitive environments, where devices built according to different standards and architectures compete for the limited available resources. These devices can differ greatly in terms of their channel conditions, user-defined utilities, action strategies, ability to sense the environment and gather information about competing users, and reason about the available information.
Spectrum sharing among multiple competing devices in the interference-limited communication systems provides such a typical scenario. In particular, the performance of each device depends on not only its own power allocation strategy, but also that of the other devices. Individual devices may differ in both their knowledge of the system-wide channel state information (which is for instance constrained by their spectrum sensing abilities and/or information exchange overheads) and their decision making mechanism for choosing their optimal power allocation (which is determined by the implemented protocol).
This paper focuses on the multi-user interaction in frequency-selective Gaussian interference channels.
To model the competitive interaction among users, the existing literature investigating this problem often adopts a game theoretic optimization perspective [1] - [12] . Throughout this paper, we focus on a simple yet practical approach that minimizes the complexity of transceivers by treating interference as additive noise.
From a particular user's perspective, it is well-known that, for fixed interference power, the optimal power allocation is the so-called water-filling solution. Therefore, the spectrum sharing problem can also be regarded as a water-filling game. Specifically, the participants in the water-filling game are modeled as players with individual goals and strategies. They compete or cooperate with each other until they can agree on an acceptable resource allocation outcome. Existing research can be categorized into two types, noncooperative games and cooperative games.
First, the formulation of the multi-user environment as a non-cooperative game has appeared in several recent works [1] - [8] . An iterative water-filling (IW) algorithm has been proposed to mitigate the mutual interference and optimize the performance without the need for a central controller [1] . At every decision stage, selfish users deploying this algorithm myopically maximize their achievable rates by water-filling across the entire frequency band until a Nash equilibrium (NE) is reached. Sufficient conditions under which the iterative water-filling algorithm converges to a unique NE are derived and the closed form solution to the water-filling problem is investigated for some special scenarios [2] - [5] . Alternatively, self-enforcing protocols are studied in the repeated game setting, where efficient, fair, and incentive compatible spectrum sharing is shown to be possible by imposing punishment in the case of misbehavior and enforcing users to cooperate [6] .
On the other hand, because the IW algorithm may lead to Pareto-inefficient solutions [7] , i.e. selfishness is detrimental in the interference channel, there also have been a number of related works studying spectrum sharing in the setting of cooperative games [9] - [12] . Several (near-) optimal algorithms were proposed to address the problem of maximization of a certain user's achievable rate while satisfying the minimum rate requirements of the other competing users. These works assume that users agree to cooperatively maximize a common objective function and require explicit information exchanges among the users.
In short, most of the existing research mainly concentrates on studying the existence and performance of NE in non-cooperative games and developing efficient algorithms to approach the Pareto boundary in cooperative games. Our focus in this paper is on the non-cooperative setting, which explicitly considers the self-interested and competitive nature of individual players. However, most of the existing works in the non-collaborative setting often neglect an important intrinsic dimension of the information-decentralized multi-user interaction. Prior non-cooperative approaches often assume homogeneous users with only the knowledge of their own private information and do not consider users' ability to improve their performance by acquiring and exploring the information of the opponents. The best response strategy of a selfish user that knows its myopic opponents' private information, including their channel state information and power constraints, was first investigated in [8] using the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) formulation. It was shown in [8] that surprisingly, a foresighted user playing the SE can improve both its performance as well as the performance of all the other users. These results highlight the significance of information availability in water-filling games. However, one key question remains unsolved: how should a foresighted user acquire its desired information and adapt its response?
As opposed to our previous approach, which assumes a foresighted user with perfect knowledge of its competitors' private information [8] , we discuss in this paper how the foresighted user without any such a priori knowledge can accumulate this knowledge and improve its performance in water-filling games. We propose that the foresighted user can explicitly model its competitors' response as a function of its power allocation by repeatedly interacting with the environment and observing the resulting interference. The concept of conjectural equilibrium (CE) is introduced to characterize the strategic behavior of a user that models the response of its myopic competing users, and the existence of this equilibrium in the water-filling game is proved. Some previously adopted solutions, including NE and SE, are shown to be special cases of the CE. Practical algorithms are developed to form accurate beliefs and search desirable power allocation strategy. It is shown that, a foresighted user without any a priori knowledge can effectively learn its desired information and guide the system to an operating point having comparable performance to the algorithm in [8] , where perfect a priori knowledge is assumed. More importantly, as opposed to the two-user algorithm in [8] , the proposed algorithm in this paper can be applied in general scenarios where more than two users exist.
The basic notion of CE was first proposed by Hahn in the context of a market model [15] . A general multi-agent framework is proposed in [16] to study the existence of and the convergence to CE in market interactions. Specifically, a strategic user is assumed to model the market price as a linear function of its desired demand. It is observed that it may be better or worse off than without modeling, depending on its initial belief. However, we note that using the linear model is purely heuristic in [16] . In contrast, we apply CE in the water-filling game, because it provides a practical solution concept to approach the performance bound of SE. We show that deploying the linear model to form conjectures can suitably explore the problem structure of the water-filling game, and therefore, lead to a substantial performance improvement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the non-cooperative game model, reviews the existing non-cooperative solutions, and introduces the concept of CE. The existence of this CE in the water-filling game is proved in Section III. Section IV develops practical algorithms to form beliefs and approach CE. Numerical simulations show that a foresighted user can achieve substantial performance improvement if it models its competitors in the water-filling game. Conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND CONJECTURAL EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we describe the mathematical model of the frequency-selective interference channel and formulate the non-cooperative multi-user water-filling game. We summarize the existing non-cooperative game theoretic solutions and introduce the conjecture equilibrium in the water-filling game context. The noise power spectral density (PSD) that receiver k experiences is denoted as
A. System Description and Existing Solutions
For user k , the transmit PSD is subject to its power constraint:
For a fixed ( ) k P f , if treating interference as noise, user k can achieve the following data rate:
where ( )
To fully capture the performance tradeoff in the system, the concept of a rate region is defined as ( )
, , : , ,
The multi-user interaction in the interference channel can be modeled as a game. Let ( )
being the set of players,
A being the set of actions available to the users (in which k A is the set of actions available to user k ), and
being the users' payoff functions (in which
R is the user k 's payoff function) [13] . In the water-filling game, the players' payoffs are the respective achievable data rates and their strategies are to determine their transmit PSDs satisfying the constraint in (1).
As mentioned already in the introduction, existing research mainly focuses on two types of games, i.e.
cooperative games and non-cooperative games. Specifically, cooperative approaches aim to maximize the weighted sum of data rates
Because of the non-convexity in the rate expression as a function of power allocations, the computational complexity of optimal solutions (e.g., exhaustive search) in finding the rate region is prohibitively high. Existing works [9] - [11] aim to approach the Pareto boundary of this rate region and provide near-optimal performance. Moreover, it should be noted that cooperation among users is indispensable for the multi-user system to operate at the Pareto boundary. On the other hand, instead of solving the optimization problem globally, the IW algorithm models the users as myopic decision makers [1] . This means that they optimize their transmit PSD by water-filling and compete to increase their transmission rates with the sole objective of maximizing their own data rates in (2) regardless of the coupling among users. In other words, users are assumed to be myopic, i.e., they update actions shortsightedly without considering the long-term impacts of taking these actions. The outcome of this non-cooperative scenario is characterized by the concept of Nash equilibrium, which is defined to be any
,
where
. The existence and the uniqueness of NE are proved under a wide range of realistic conditions and can be obtained by the IW algorithm [2] - [4] .
The recent approach in [8] demonstrates that the myopic behavior can be further improved because this does not consider the coupling nature of players' actions and payoffs. If a selfish user gets the private information about its competitors and knows how they react, the best response strategy is to play the SE strategy. To define SE, we first define the action * k a to be a best response (BR) to actions k a − if
, 
The strategy profile 
Specifically, to find the SE in the water-filling game, we need to solve the following bi-level programming problem [8] , where user 1 is assumed to be the foresighted user: 
It should be pointed out that the foresighted user needs to know the private information ( ) ( ) , ,
of all its competitors in order to formulate the above optimization. The previous approach in [8] assumes that the foresighted user has the perfect knowledge of this private information. Importantly, it was shown in [8] that users' performance is substantially improved compared with that of IW algorithm if the foresighted user plays the SE strategy, even though the remaining users behave myopically. However, how such a foresighted user should accumulate this required information remains unsolved. In the remaining part of this paper, we will show that the foresighted user can obtain the information and improve its performance 1 For the cases where the equilibrium solution ( ) k NE a is not unique for every k a , the Stackelberg equilibrium needs to be reformulated [14] . Note that in this paper,
NE a is always unique in the water-filling game.
by forming conjectures over the behavior of its competitors through the repeated interaction.
Before introducing the conjectural equilibrium, we define the discretized version of the water-filling game. In practice, instead of optimizing over continuous frequency variables, the frequency band is often divided into a total number of N small frequency bins [9] - [11] , such that each frequency bin could be viewed as a flat fading channel and ( ) ( ) ,
can be approximated as a constant within each small frequency bin. Denote
, , n N jk ∈ ∈ K . As a result, (2) and (7) can be reformulated correspondingly.
B. Conjectural Equilibrium
In game-theoretic analysis, conclusions about the reached equilibria are based on assumptions about what knowledge the players possess. For example, the standard NE solution assumes that every player knows its own payoff and believes that the other players' actions will not change. Therefore, it chooses to myopically maximize its own payoff [13] . Another example is that, to play the SE strategy, the foresighted user needs to know the structure of the resulting To rigorously define CE, we need to include two new elements S and s and, based on this, reformulate the strategic game ( )
S is the state space, where k S is the part of the state relevant to the k th user. Specifically, the state in the water-filling game is defined as the interference that users experience. The utility function
is a map from users' state space to real numbers, 
From the definition, we can see that, at CE, all users' expectations based on their beliefs are realized and each user behaves optimally according to its expectation. In other words, users' beliefs are consistent with the outcome of the play and they behave optimally with respect to their beliefs. CE considers the users' beliefs rather than their perfect knowledge ( ) k NE a as in SE, which makes CE an appropriate solution concept when the perfect knowledge is not available. The key problem is how to configure the belief functions such that it leads to a CE having a satisfactory performance. Section III discusses this problem in water-filling games.
III. CONJECTURAL EQUILIBRIUM IN WATER-FILLING GAMES
In this section, we discuss how to configure a user's belief about its experienced interference as a linear function of its transmitted power, and show that such CE exists and it is a relaxation of both NE and SE. We begin by stating several fundamental assumptions used throughout the investigation hereafter.
Assumption 1:
There is only one foresighted user modeling its competitors' reaction as a function of its allocated power, and all the remaining users are myopic users that deploy the IW algorithm. Without loss of generality, we assume that this foresighted user is user 1.
Assumption 2:
Every user is able to perfectly measure its experienced equivalent noise PSD 
Assumption 4:
In the lower-level problem formed by user 2, , K in (7), there always exists a unique NE.
For the sufficient conditions of the existence and uniqueness of NE, we refer readers to [2] - [4] .
We formally define the concept of stationary interference. , ,
in the water-filling game and it can also be denoted as ( )
A. Linear Belief of Stationary Interference
As discussed before, both the state space and belief functions need to be defined in order to investigate the existence of CE. In the market models for pure exchange economy [16] , the action set of each consumer is its desired demand based on the market price. The market price is also impacted by the other consumers' announced demand. Therefore, it is natural to define the state to be the market price in such scenarios.
However, it should be pointed out that, for the problem considered in [16] , modeling and updating the belief on the market price as a linear function of the excess demand is entirely heuristic. However, this is not the case in our setting, where forming linear conjectures is natural for the considered interference game.
In the water-filling game, we define state k S to be the stationary interference caused to user k , because besides its own power allocation, its utility only depends on the interference that its competitors cause to it.
Notice that the action available to user k is to choose the transmitted power allocations subjected to its maximum power constraint. By the definition of belief function in Section II.B, we need to express the stationary interference as a function of the transmitted power. As we will see later, it is natural to deploy linear belief models due to the linearity of caused stationary interference in terms of the allocated power, and hence, forming such beliefs can lead to significant performance improvements because they capture the inherent characteristics of the actual interference coupling.
for arbitrarily small positive variation in power ε . Given user 1's power allocation P 1 ,
represents the power that user 2, , K allocate in the n th channel at equilibrium. Vector 
which is defined to be: 
is the Lagrange multiplier of Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 indicates that, the first derivative with respect to a foresighted user's allocated power in a certain channel is sufficient to capture how the stationary interference varies locally in that channel. We observe from equality (11) that ( )
Therefore, user 1 can define its belief function using the linear form 
B. Existence of Conjectural Equilibrium
Under the same known sufficient conditions discussed in [3] [4] [8] for guaranteeing the existence of NE and SE, the existence of CE can be proved by showing that the first two types of equilibrium are special cases of CE. To this end, Table I compares the optimality conditions of the three types of equilibria in the water-filling game. Table I . Comparison among NE, SE, and CE in water-filling games.
As shown in Table I Proof: In order to show that both NE and SE are special cases of CE, we only need to verify that at NE and SE, user 1's action is optimal with respect to its belief and its belief agrees with its state. First, clearly, NE is a trivial CE with the parameters 1 2 , 0
the optimal solution of the discretized version of problem (7) . To prove that SE is a CE, we need to find the corresponding n β and n γ and show that SE also solves problem (13) . Consider the belief function in Table I with the parameters
. As discussed before, such parameters preserve all the local information of the objective of problem (7) around P SE into problem (13) . KKT conditions hold at P SE since it solves problem (7). A sufficient condition which ensures SE to be a CE is that problem (13) belongs to convex optimization, because KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for convex programming to attain its optimum. Appendix B provides a sufficient condition 1 SC under which problem (13) is convex, thereby proving that SE is a special CE given these conditions. ■ Proposition 2 indicates that the two isolating points, NE and SE, are both CE, if parameters
are properly chosen. Therefore, CE can be viewed as an operational approach to attain SE if the system-wide information required for solving SE is not available. It is because only the local information including stationary interference 1 n I and its first derivative is required to formulate problem (13) , and this information can be obtained using measurements performed at the receiver.
In addition, we are interested in the existence of other CEs besides these two points. Denote the parameters of any CE, e.g. NE or SE, as
, and the optimal solution of problem (13) given parameters , β γ as ( )
R be a mapping defined as ( )
The following proposition gives a sufficient condition which ensures that infinite CEs exist. In summary, proposition 1, 2, and 3 characterize the existence and structure of conjectural equilibrium in water-filling games. As shown in Fig. 2 , NE and SE can be both special cases of CE. Open sets of CE that contain NE and SE may exist in the β -γ plane and these sets may be connected. SE attains the maximal data rate that a foresighted user can achieve. If the foresighted user properly sets up its parameters , β γ , the solution of CE in problem (13) coincides with the solution of SE in problem (7). More importantly, as opposed to the SE in which the knowledge of the system-wide private information is required, CE assumes that the foresighted user knows only its stationary interference and the first derivatives with respect to the allocated power, which greatly reduces the complexity of information acquisition. Therefore, in order to approach the performance upper bound given by SE, this paper adopts the approach of CE. Section IV will develop practical conjecture forming and updating algorithms to select out of the infinite CEs a desirable power allocation scheme that provides comparable achievable rates with SE.
Proposition 3 (Infinite

IV. ACHIEVING DESIRABLE CONJECTURAL EQUILIBRIA
Since proposition 3 shows that infinite CEs may exist and SE is the most desirable CE for a foresighted user, it should wisely choose the parameters , n n β γ of belief functions in order to attain SE as a CE.
Moreover, the declarative conclusions drawn in Section III provide no hint on the achievability of the CE.
However, in practice, it is more important to construct algorithmic mechanisms to attain the desirable CE.
To arrive at CE, a multi-agent learning approach is proposed for the repeated game setting [16] . Similarly, this section proposes that users can update their beliefs in the repeated interaction setting and numerically examines their performance. Before going into the technical details, it should be pointed out that the pursuit of the practical solution's convergence to CE is not the principal goal of our investigation.
Instead, computing power allocation strategies that require only local information and achieve comparable rates with SE (which requires global information) is the ultimate objective rather than the convergence. In other words, any power allocation strategy that lies outside the open CE set in Fig. 2 is favorable if it can improve the performance compared with NE. Update in each iteration, user 1 needs to solve problem (13) . If proposition 2's assumption is not satisfied, problem (13) belongs to the class of non-convex optimization, which is generally hard to solve and standard optimization algorithms can only be used to determine local maxima [17] . However, in this application, we are able to show that, as long as the number of frequency bins N is sufficiently large, problem (13) satisfies the time-sharing condition [10] , and its global optimum can be efficiently computed. x and n * y be optimal solutions to the optimization problem (10) with = x P P and = y P P , respectively. An optimization problem of the form (10) is said to satisfy the time-sharing condition if for any 0 1 v ≤ ≤ , there always exists a feasible solution n z , such that ( )
A. Conjecture-based Rate Maximization
The following proposition indicates that problem (13) satisfies the time-sharing condition.
Proposition 4 (Satisfaction of Time-sharing Condition):
As the total number of sub-carriers N goes to infinity, problem (13) satisfies the time-sharing condition.
Proof: Specifically, for the optimization problem (13), ( ) ( ) 
convex, a bisection or gradient-type search over the Lagrangian dual variable η is guaranteed to converge to the global optimum. Specifically, Algorithm 1 summarizes such a dual method that solves non-convex problem (13) using bisection update. As long as the time-sharing condition is satisfied, Algorithm 1 converges to the global optimum. Hence, we can always solve problem (13) regardless of its convexity.
Algorithm 1 :
A dual method that solves problem (13) using bisection update
until i η converges Table III . A dual algorithm that solves problem (13) . Table IV summarizes the procedure of algorithm "Conjecture-based Rate Maximization" (CRM). Next, we make several remarks about this algorithm. First, since we want to achieve better performance than NE, the initial operating point 1,0 P is set to be the power allocation strategy 1
NE
P
that user 1 will choose if it adopts the IW algorithm. Second, in 2 Update , the global optimum c 1 P is not directly used to update 1, 1 n t P + .
As shown in Fig. 3 , this is because problem (13) is only a local approximation at ,t 1 P of the original SE problem (7) that we want to solve. Using 
Conjecture-based Rate Maximization initialization :
1,0 1 0,
Update
.
II.
( ) 
until no improvement can be made. Table IV . Conjecture-based rate maximization. Fig. 3 . Mismatch between problem (7) and (13).
B. Illustrative Numerical Examples
This sub-section compares the performance of CRM with the IW algorithm and a two-user suboptimal algorithm (TSA) that searches SE assuming perfect knowledge of its opponent's private information [8] .
We simulate a system with 200 sub-carriers over the 10-MHz band. We consider frequency-selective channels using a four-ray Rayleigh model with the exponential power profile and 100 ns root mean square delay spread. The power of each ray is decreasing exponentially according to its delay.
We first simulate the two-user scenario with
The total power of all rays of ( )
11
H f and
( )
22
H f is normalized as one, and that of ( )
12
( )
21
H f is normalized as 0.5 . Fig. 4 shows an example of user 1's power allocations when deploying different algorithms under the same conditions. In IW algorithm, user 1 water-fills the whole frequency band by regarding its competitor's interference as background noise. In contrast, user 1 will not water-fill if choosing CRM and TSA. It avoids the myopic behavior and improves its performance by explicitly considering the stationary interference caused by its opponent.
To evaluate the performance, we tested R′ . The curve indicates that there is a probability of 59% that CRM returns the same power allocation strategy as IW.
On the other hand, the average improvement for user 1 of CRM over IW is 16.8%, which achieves almost the same performance as TSA. As shown in Fig. 5 The iteration time required by CRM is summarized in Table V . As mentioned above, CRM stops after just one iteration with a probability of 59% due to the problem mismatch shown in Fig. 3 . In most scenarios, CRM terminates within 4 iterations and the average number of required iteration is only 1.84. To further improve the performance of CRM, we can modify the original CRM to handle the problem mismatch between (7) and (13) . Notice that problem (13) is only a local approximation of problem (7) at ,t 1 P .
Additional constraints can be added in Algorithm 1, such that the optimum of problem (13) for this modified CRM. As opposed to CRM, the probability that the modified CRM returns the same power allocation strategy as IW is reduced to 36% and the average performance improvement is also increased for both users. Specifically, the average performance improvement for user 1 is 24.4% and that of user 2 is 33.6%. However, Table V shows that the improvement is achieved at the cost of more iterations.
Probability of required iterations We also tested performance of modified CRM in multi-user cases where TSA cannot be applied. We simulated the three-user scenarios with
The total power of all rays of
normalized as one, and that of
is normalized as 0.33 . Fig. 7 shows the simulated cumulative
. The average improvement for user 1 of modified CRM over IW is 26.3%, and that of the rest users is 9.7%. We can see that, it benefits most of the participants in the water-filling game if a foresighted user forms accurate conjectures and plays the conjecture equilibrium strategy. 
V. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces the concept of conjectural equilibrium in non-cooperative water-filling games and discusses how a foresighted user can model its experienced interference as a function of its own power allocation in order to improve its own data rate. The existence of conjectural equilibrium is proved and both game theoretic solutions, including Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium, are shown to be special cases of this conjectural equilibrium. Practical algorithms based on conjectural equilibrium are developed to determine desirable power allocation strategies. Numerical results verify that a foresighted user forming proper conjectures can improves both its own achievable rate as well as the rates of other participants, even if it has no a priori knowledge of its competitors' private information.
APPENDIX A
Proof of Proposition 1
By the definition of 1 n I , we have
. We differentiate two different cases:
1)
If there does not exist any Without loss of generality, we temporarily assume that
. When users 2, , K reach the equilibrium, we have from the optimality conditions of water-filling solution:
are the water-levels of all the water-filling users. Note that the sufficient conditions of existence and uniqueness of NE generally require 1 < G [3] , which leads to the fact that + I G is invertible. Therefore, we have 
in which 
, n c sign NE α n P 1 that depends on both α n and the non-zero elements of ( ) n NE P 1 . water-filling functions [3] . We need to treat the left-sided and the right-sided first derivatives respectively, and similar conclusions can be derived in the same way as in the first part. ■
2) If there exists
{ } 2, , k K ∈ satisfying 0 n k P = and
APPENDIX B
Proof of Proposition 2
To solve the CE, the optimization solving CE in Table I is essentially 
0 2 2 n n n n n n n n n n n I I I I P and I P P P P σ
P P P P P P is well-defined for all y Y ∈ , and is continuous.
We can restrict the domain of parameters β and γ in closed and bounded set, e.g. as N equations with 2N unknowns, hence, the equilibrium is usually not a single point but a continuous surface. We can explore the structure of ( ) 
Note that the other root of equation (15) is removed by checking its feasibility in 1 , , n n n f σ β γ dom . By substituting (16) into (11) and (9), we can explicitly express ( ) , F β γ in terms of β and γ , resulting in a very complex form of the surface. ■
